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29 December 1960

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CURRENT SUPPORT BRIEF

POLISH REGIME EXAGGERATES RESULTS OF 1960 HARVEST

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This report represents the immediate views of the originating intelligence components of the Office of Research and Reports. Comments are solicited.

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POLISH REGIME EXAGGERATES RESULTS OF 1960 HARVEST

Polish Communist Party officials appear determined to insist that the 1960 crop was good, in spite of strong evidence to the contrary. Since June, reports by the regime have become progressively more optimistic about the average yields of grain, potatoes, and sugar beets, until the yields now represent postwar highs. The glowing reports on the results of the 1960 harvest may be intended to mitigate criticism from "socialist" neighbors concerning lagging collectivization, and thus permit the regime to continue a policy of increasing production first, and collectivizing agriculture later. Another reason, of lesser importance, could be an attempt to convince the peasants that it will not pay to hold off selling grain and potatoes to the state--sales of both were lagging in October.

Polish announcements on the average yield of the four major grains (wheat, rye, barley, and oats) through June indicated that the grain harvest would be much less than the excellent 1959 crop. Beginning in July, however, Polish statements became progressively more optimistic and, by September, had edged the yield up to 15.6 quintals per hectare, as compared to the record yield of 15.7 quintals per hectare in 1959. Finally, a report on 1960 agricultural production, released by Trybuna Ludu on 20 November, claimed the average yield was 16.1 quintals per hectare. 1/ Even greater success was claimed by the Minister of Agriculture, Mieczyslaw Jagielski, who reported in November that the average yield was between 16.4 and 16.6 quintals per hectare. 2/ Similarly, in November the estimates of yields of potatoes and sugar beets were increased over earlier estimates and now represent postwar highs.

Except for sugar beets, available evidence does not support the Polish claims, and yields are estimated to be less than in 1959. A comparison of the 1959 yield data with the 1960 estimates is as follows, in quintals per hectare:

	<u>1959^{3/}</u>	<u>Polish Claims^{4/}</u>		<u>Estimate.</u> <u>For 1960</u>
		<u>For 1960</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>Nov</u>	
Four grains	15.7	15.6	16.1	14.3
Potatoes	128	125.0	131.0	119.0
Sugar beets	159	233.0	250.0	233.0

The total production of the four major grains in 1960, based upon the latest Polish yield and acreage data, is approximately 14.3 million tons, compared with 14.1 million tons in the record year of 1959. However, the US agricultural officer in Warsaw has reported that conversations with local government agriculturists and with farmers, as well as his own observations, indicate a grain harvest less than in 1959. On the basis of all available evidence, the production of grain in 1960 is estimated at 13 million tons, or 1.3 million tons less than the Polish estimate.

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It is likely that the Polish regime has intentionally exaggerated the level of the 1960 harvest and overall agricultural production, at least partially for the purpose of defending Gomulka's agricultural policy before the rest of the Bloc. Gomulka has been walking a tight rope for 4 years by not pushing the socialization of agriculture, and criticism of his failure to do so has been mounting from other Bloc countries, including China. 5/ Khrushchev apparently has supported Gomulka's agricultural policy as long as Poland could show gains in agricultural production. 6/ Probably Khrushchev has been willing to concede some shortcomings in Polish agricultural policy in return for political support, but he has indicated that Poland should show more progress in socializing agriculture. Gomulka's position was undoubtedly weakened last year when production declined, but a compensatory factor was a simultaneous decline in agricultural production in East Germany and Czechoslovakia--both countries have been very critical of Polish policy. Announcement of a decline, or no increase, in agricultural production for the second consecutive year, however, could expose Gomulka's agricultural policy to more intense criticism, especially since Czechoslovakia and East Germany, which pushed collectivization in 1960, have announced sizeable increases in agricultural production for 1960.

Polish collectivization policy will probably come under fire again at the annual meeting in December of the CEMA subcommittee on agriculture, 7/ and at a possible meeting in Moscow of Bloc agricultural representatives in February or March, 1961. All evidence seems to indicate that the Polish regime during the next five years intends to raise agricultural production before pushing collectivization. Therefore, it appears likely that Gomulka, anticipating criticism at the recent Communist "summit" meeting as well as at the CEMA meeting and the forthcoming meeting of agricultural representatives, has decided to play the same game that some other Bloc regimes do--pad agricultural statistics by reporting biological* rather than barn yields. By providing statistical evidence that Polish policy is paying off, he may hope to mitigate Bloc pressure to step-up the socialization of agriculture--a change in policy which Polish agriculturists claim would result in a sharp decline in agricultural production. Such a move could effectively reduce criticism, especially at a time when the USSR is having difficulties in agriculture.

* Losses, such as those in harvesting, threshing, and transportation, are not deducted.

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Analyst: [REDACTED] 25X1A

Coord: [REDACTED]

Sources:

STATSPEC 1. [REDACTED]

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2. State, Warsaw. Dsp 258, 2 Dec 60. OFF USE.
3. Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1960. U.
4. State, Warsaw. Dsp 258, 2 Dec 60. OFF USE.

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5. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]

STATSPEC

29 December 1960

CIA/RR CB-60-58

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495701

9 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1A

ATTENTION :

FROM

: Chief, Publications Staff, ORR

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SUBJECT

: Release of Information

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1. It is requested that information from the following source in CIA/RR CB 60-58, Polish Regime Exaggerates Results of 1960 Harvest, 29 December 1960, SECRET/NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL, be examined to determine whether or not there is any objection to the release of this information

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2. If this information is approved for release this source will be deleted from the bibliography before the report is forwarded to the foreign recipients.

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Attachments:

Copies 44 & 45 of CB 60-58

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Approved. This is identical with the clearance given yesterday for SECRET only.

INT/RC - 10 January 1961

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Chief, Current Support Staff, ORR

20 December 1960

THRU : Chief, Materials Division, ORR

Chief, Food and Agriculture Branch, D/M

Proposed Current Support Bulletin.

1. Attached for your approval as a Current Support Bulletin is an intelligence article entitled "Polish Regime Exaggerates Results of 1960 Harvest."

2. This article is believed to be of interest to both political and economic analysts working on Poland within the intelligence community.

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3. The article has been informally coordinated with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] OCI and [REDACTED] of your staff.

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4. The analyst responsible for the article is [REDACTED] ext. 3800.

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Attachment:

TO: Chief, Dissemination Branch, Support Staff, OCI

FROM: Chief, Current Support Staff, ORR

SUBJECT: Distribution of Current Support Memorandum No. **CIA/RR CB-60-58**

POLISH REGIMEN EXAGGERATES RESULTS OF 1960 HARVEST (Title) **20 December 1960** (Date)

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ST/CS
29 December 1960

(Date)

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FROM: Chief, Current Support Staff, ORR

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POLISH REGIME EXAGGERATES RESULTS OF 1960 HARVEST 29 December 1960
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Note

A request to have free control restriction on source #6 has been made by EL on 27 Dec.

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60-58 date 29 Dec 60

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